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Abstract 
This article aims to shed some light on post-mortem privacy, a phenomenon rather 
neglected in the legal literature. Acknowledging the quite controversial nature of the 
phenomenon and certain policy and legal arguments pro and contra, the paper 
explores the data protection (informational privacy) aspect of the issue. More 
precisely, the focus is on the distinction between the current and the newly proposed 
data protection regime in the European Union (EU), assessing how these regimes are 
susceptible to protecting the deceased’s personal data. The paper will note the 
differences between the proposed text of the Data Protection Regulation Proposal and 
subsequent amendments. Moreover, the paper will assess which solutions are more 
suitable to enable incorporation of the post-mortem privacy in the data protection 
regime, acknowledging the overall lack of certainty regarding the finalisation of the 
Regulation’s content. In so doing, this paper aims to detect elements in the new 
regime that seem to be promoting, at least theoretically, the propertisation of personal 
data, while partly disregarding its human rights basis. Having this assumption in mind 
and noting the difference between property, liability and contracts regimes (e.g. 
transmission on death), it will be argued that the new regime, at least in theory, could 
be perceived as promoting post-mortem privacy and, under certain circumstances, 
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enabling better control of deceased people’s personal data. The paper, however, does 
not support this change and suggests that post-mortem privacy should be 
contemplated within the human rights-based regime.  
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1. Introduction 
Post-mortem privacy (deceased persons’ privacy), has been, so far, a phenomenon of 
interest predominantly for sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists and other 
humanities and social sciences scholars.1 It has not been, however, such an interesting 
subject of research for legal academics and does not represent a term of art in the legal 
profession (not even amongst privacy scholars).2 This issue, nevertheless, deserves 
the attention of legal scholarship, bearing in mind the development of technology, the 
accompanying social relations, and all the possible interests and values at stake. Some 
of those rather conflicting interests will be touched upon in the following section.  
The growth of the Internet-enabled ubiquitous technologies has led to the growth of 
“digital natives,”3 along with the storing of enormous amount of digital assets and 
personal data online. The number of digital natives worldwide is significant,4 and the 
effect and importance of their digital identities cannot be disregarded. A significant 
number of them die every day.5 Some of them would like to see their wishes as to 
                                                
1 See e.g. C J Sofka, K R Gilbert and I N Cupit (eds), Dying, death and grief in an online universe 
(New York: Springer Publishing Company, 2012); B Carroll and K Landry “Logging on and letting 
out: Using online social networkings to grieve and to mourn” (2010) 30(5) Bulletin of Science, 
Technology & Society 341-349; D Klass “Continuing conversations about continuing bonds” (2006) 30 
Death Studies 843-858. 
2 With exceptions such as for example: Amsterdam Privacy Conference 2012, Panel on Death and 
Post-Mortem Privacy in the Digital Age, 8 Oct 2012, Chair: Lilian Edwards, Panellists: Edina 
Harbinja, Anna E. Haverinen,  Damien McCallig, Elaine Kasket, available at 
http://www.apc2012.org/sites/default/files/pdffiles/APC%20programme_0.pdf (accessed 10 Jan 2013) 
or L Essers “Online Life After Death Faces Legal Uncertainty” CIO, 08 Oct 2012 available at 
http://www.cio.com/article/718253/Online_Life_After_Death_Faces_Legal_Uncertainty  (press report 
on the panel) (accessed 10 Jan 2013). The panel was not purely legal in character, but rather 
interdisciplinary with legal observations amongst others. For the US perspective see e.g. M Wilkens 
“Privacy and Security During Life, Access After Death: Are They Mutually Exclusive?” (2011) 62 
Hastings Law Journal 1037-1064; J Atwater “Who Owns E-mail? Do You Have the Right to Decide 
the Disposition of Your Private Digital Life?” (2006) 2 Utah Law Review 397-418; J J Darrow and G R 
Ferrera “Who Owns a Decedent’s E-Mails: Inheritable Probate Assets or Property of the Network?” 
(2007) 10 New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 281-320. 
3 Palfrey and Gasser, for instance, define digital natives as a population that satisfy the following 
criteria: born after the year of 1980; have access to digital technology; and have skills to use digital 
technology “in relatively advanced ways“. J Palfrey and U Gasser “Reclaiming an Awkward Term: 
What we Might Learn from "Digital Natives"” (2011) 7 A Journal of Law and Policy for the 
Information Society 33-56, at 37-38; Cheatham defines digital natives as a generation that has never 
known a world without digital technologies. C Cheatham “Public Relations: Dancing with Digital 
Natives: A Great Resource for Understanding Those Who Have Grown up with Digital Technology” 
(2011-2012) 16 AALL Spectrum 8-10. 
4 For example, the number of Facebook users has reached more than a billion worldwide, see 
Facebook, Key facts, “One billion monthly active users as of October 2012” available at 
http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts (accessed 10 Jan 2013). 
5 For instance, research suggests that approximately 375,000 Facebook users in the United States die 
every year. J Mazzone “Facebook’s Afterlife” (2012) 90  North Carolina Law Review 1643-185, at 
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what happens to their personal data after death respected.6 These wishes could, 
however, clash with the wishes and interests of society, of theory, and of families and 
friends, as seen in the scarce case law (discussed in the following section).  
The phenomenon of post-mortem privacy can be contemplated from the perspective 
of privacy in general, or of informational privacy more specifically (i.e. protection of 
personal data).7 It has, however, many other implications and angles, such as 
protection of personality rights, author’s moral rights, dignity, defamation, libel, 
organ donation and other strictly personal rights and claims. The focus of this paper 
will be on the informational aspect of privacy (data protection) and its legal 
implications within the current (the Data Protection Directive8 and some national 
rules) and perspective data protection regime(s).  
The issue of what happens to the deceased’s data and individuals` privacy post-
mortem is far from clear and settled from a legal and regulatory perspective. 
Currently, most of the data protection regimes do not include protection of decedents` 
personal data and they do not legally recognise this aspect of "post-mortem privacy”. 
Therefore, the question arises as to whether personal data should be protected both in 
life and upon death.  
Notwithstanding the conflicts that might arise, this paper seeks to explore if it would 
be legally viable to recognise the deceased’s right to privacy at the EU level. 
Deceased person’s privacy is discussed herein in the context of their personal data, 
and whether this data should be protected through data protection legislation, 
acknowledging that the concept of “the deceased’s right to privacy” is broader and 
includes, inter alia, data protection. The broader conception of “post-mortem privacy” 
                                                                                                                                       
1647; more specifically see N Lustig “2.89m Facebook Users Will Die in 2012, 580,000 in the USA” 6 
June 2012, Natan Lustig Blog, at http://www.nathanlustig.com/2012/06/06/2-89m-facebook-users-will-
die-in-2012-580000-in-the-usa/ (accessed 20 Feb 2013) 
6 Apart from the interest amongst humanities and social sciences scholars, the issue had been of a wide 
media interest in the past few years, thus raising awareness amongst the Internet users and making 
them ask questions about its legal implications. See J Hopper, “Digital Afterlife: What happens to your 
online accounts when you die?” Rock Center, 01 Jun 2012, available at 
http://rockcenter.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/06/01/11995859-digital-afterlife-what-happens-to-your-
online-accounts-when-you-die?lite (accessed 05 Jan 2013); E Carroll, “What happens to your 
Facebook account when you die?” The Digital Beyond 07 Feb 2012 available at 
http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/2012/02/what-happens-to-your-facebook-account-when-you-die/ 
(accessed 05 Jan 2013); J Shah, “Digital Life After Death: America One Step Ahead. On your passing, 
your online presence will remain. But should it?” Morrisons solicitors 22 Feb 2012 available at 
http://www.morrlaw.com/news/digital-life-after-death-america-one-step-ahead  (accessed 05 Jan 
2013); R. Herold, “How to Protect Your Privacy After You Die”  Infosec island 06 Apr 2010 available 
at http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/3537-How-to-Protect-Your-Privacy-After-You-Die.html 
(accessed 05 Jan 2013) etc. 
7 Privacy can be further conceived as the right to be let alone; privacy as a limited access to the self; 
privacy as secrecy; privacy as personhood or privacy as intimacy. See e.g. D J Solove, 
“Conceptualizing privacy” (2002) California Law Review 1087-155, at 1093. 
8 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, Official Journal L 281, 23/11/1995 p. 0031 – 0050. 
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and its legal protection is sketched briefly in the following section. After this general 
discussion, the paper assesses the current and newly proposed data protection regime 
in the EU in relation to the deceased’s data. It aims to explore whether the deceased’s 
privacy could be protected within the current data protection framework or the 
proposed regulation9 would be a more suitable instrument to achieve this goal. It 
further identifies some elements of the propertisation of personal data in the proposed 
regime. In the next sections, the paper questions whether the regime would depart, to 
some extent, from its human rights basis to commodification and propertisation of 
personal data. If this proves correct, then the new regime could be deemed favourable 
to post-mortem privacy, since property entails transfer in life and on death, whereas 
torts or liability regimes mainly protect the living.  
However, it is argued here that this move would not be the best solution, neither for 
the protection of personal data of the living, nor for the protection of the deceased’s 
data. The regime should aim to operate from a human rights basis; solutions for 
protecting post-mortem privacy should be sought within that framework. The paper 
therefore suggests that the real improvement would be an explicit introduction of 
post-mortem privacy protection in the proposed Regulation. Noting the direct effect of 
a regulation in all the EU member states, this change would harmonise regimes, and 
enable the same level of protection for EU users and their personal data.  
The precisely defined solutions are, however, beyond the scope of this paper. It does 
not aim to provide all the answers to why stronger post-mortem privacy protection is 
desirable, as this will be subject to a broader discussion and a careful policy choice, 
weighing cautiously post-mortem privacy with other rights, values and interests, as 
suggested briefly in the next section. This paper could perhaps serve as a starting 
point for these broader considerations.  
2. Some controversies surrounding post-mortem privacy  
Post-mortem privacy, at a legal conceptual level, could refer to various different areas 
of law (e.g. human rights, property, succession, personality rights, intellectual 
property, etc.). In all these areas there is a different legal attitude towards the dead, in 
addition to the differences between legal systems. Some of the major ones will be 
presented briefly.  
In the English common law system, for instance, there is a long recognised principle 
of actio personalis moritur cum persona (personal causes of actions die with the 
person, e.g. defamation claims, breach of confidence claims),10 implying the negative 
attitude towards rights of the dead. However, this attitude in common law does not 
                                                
9 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council  on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on  the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final, 2012/0011 (COD), 25.1.2012. 
10 Established in Beker v Bolton (1808) 1 Camp. 439; 170 ER 1033. The principle has been revised in 
the UK and now only pertains to causes of action for defamation and certain claims for bereavement. 
See the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) 1934 Act c. 41, Race Relations Act 1976 c. 74, Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 c. 65, Disability Discrimination act 1995 c. 50 and Administration of Justice 
Act 1982 c. 53. 
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pertain to, for instance, moral rights of authors. In the United Kingdom (UK), moral 
rights subsist as long as copyright in work subsists (including the right to privacy of 
certain photographs and films), except for the right against false attribution of work, 
which lasts until 20 years after a person’s death.11  
On the other hand, many EU member states are of the civilian tradition which has 
historically been more inclined to recognise the persistence of similar rights after 
death. This protection regards privacy in a broader sense, dignity and moral rights of 
authors. For example in the German Mephisto12 and Marlene Dietrich cases13, the 
courts granted protection for both the non-commercial (dignity, privacy) and 
commercial interests of the deceased (the use of name, voice, or image for financial 
gain).14 However, the French courts took a different position. In the case of SA 
Editions Plon v Mitterand,15 Court of Cassation held that “the right to act in respect of 
privacy disappears when the person in question, the sole holder of that right, dies”. 
The position of civilian systems towards moral rights of creators is, however, much 
clearer and it consists of stronger and more persistent rights. In France, for instance, 
creators’ moral rights are perpetual, as a consequence of the dualistic conception of 
copyright (i.e., a separate treatment of economic and moral rights); in Germany, moral 
rights last as long as economic rights, as a consequence of a monistic conception.16 
                                                
11 See s 77 – 86 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 c. 48 and commentary in L Bently and B 
Sherman Intellectual property law, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), at 167; or H L 
MacQueen et al. Contemporary intellectual property: law and policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2011), at 104 – 118. 
12 Mephisto, BVerfGE 30, 173, Federal Constitutional Court (First Division), 24 February 1971, 
translated by J. A. Weir: “It would be inconsistent with the constitutional mandate of the inviolability 
of human dignity, which underlies all basic rights, if a person could be belittled and denigrated after his 
death. Accordingly an individual’s death does not put an end to the state’s duty under Art. 1 I GG to 
protect him from assaults on his human dignity”, available at: The University of Texas at Austin, 
School of Law, Institute for Transnational Law, Foreign Law Translations, 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=1478 
(accessed 03 Apr 2013). 
13 Marlene Dietrich Case BGH 1 ZR 49/97, 01 December 1999, translated by Raymond Youngs, 
available at: The University of Texas at Austin, School of Law, Institute for Transnational Law, 
Foreign Law Translations, 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=726  
(accessed 03 Apr 2013). 
14 Ibid. Judgment states: “...b) The components of the right of personality which are of financial value 
remain after the death of the holder of the right of personality, at any rate as long as the non-material 
interests are still protected. The corresponding powers pass to the heir of the holder of the personality 
right and can be exercised by him in accordance with the express or presumed will of the deceased.”, at 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=726 
(accessed 03 Apr 2013). 
15 SA Editions Plon v. Mitterand (Civ. 1, 14 December, 1999, Bull. no. 345), Translated French Cases 
and Materials under the direction of Professor B. Markesinis and M. le Conseiller Dominique Hascher, 
Translated by: Tony Weir available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/french/case.php?id=1240 
(accessed 10 Jan 2013). 
16 For a useful comparison between English, French and German law attitudes to moral rights see S 
Newman, “The development of copyright and moral rights in the European legal systems” (2011) 
33(11) European Intellectual Property Review 677-689. 
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Therefore, looking at these aspects of a general conception of privacy, there are 
perhaps more arguments for the protection of post mortem privacy than against this 
protection. 
Conversely, the legal conception of privacy as a human right (Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights), does not really offer arguments for the 
proponents of post-mortem privacy protection. According to the European Court of 
Human Rights case law, Article 8 grants protection only to the living.17 In numerous 
cases, the Court has refused to recognise this right to the deceased, unless their 
privacy is connected to the privacy of the living individuals.18  
The topic is therefore rather controversial and there is not a simple answer to the 
question of whether personal data of the deceased— a narrow conception of post-
mortem privacy, should be protected. At a policy level, the proponents of legal 
recognition of this phenomenon could argue that there should be some form of 
protection for the deceased’s privacy, since they are not able to shape their public 
image and protect their dignity. Also, some could argue, that pursuant to the principle 
of freedom of testation, that the wishes of the deceased should be respected and that 
protecting the privacy of the deceased also protects the mourning family. Conversely 
and understandably, these persons are subject to less harm, so the protection should 
not equate to the protection granted to living persons, if it is to be awarded at all.19 
Moreover, the assumed interests of the deceased could conflict with the interests of 
their family and friends as acknowledged in United States (US) case law. 20 In these 
cases, the privacy interests of the deceased prevailed over the requests and wishes of 
their families, and the families were denied of the deceased person’s personal 
belongings (emails and the content of Facebook profile). Furthermore, there could be 
serious implications for free speech, for media rights, and for keeping accurate 
historical records.21   
                                                
17 Jäggi v. Switzerland, no. 58757/00, ECHR 2006-X, Estate of Kresten Filtenborg Mortensen v. 
Denmark (dec.), no. 1338/03, ECHR 2006-V, Koch v. Germany no. 497/09, ECHR 19/07/2012. 
18 See Estate of Kresten Filtenborg Mortensen v. Denmark, where the Court made a distinction 
between the cases where the living lodged a complaint for the breach of their privacy in the connection 
to deceased, as opposed to a deceased person’s right to respect for private or family life. The Court 
concluded: “In the present case the individual in question, namely KFM, was deceased when the 
alleged violation took place and hence when his estate, on his behalf, lodged the complaint with the 
Court alleging an interference with his right, or rather his corpse’s right, to respect for private life. In 
such circumstances, the Court is not prepared to conclude that there was interference with KFM’s right 
to respect for private life within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention.” 
19  J Berg “Grave secrets: Legal and ethical analysis of postmortem confidentiality” (2001) 34 
Connecticut Law Review 81-122, at 94. 
20 as e.g In re Ellsworth, No. 2005-296, 651-DE (Mich. Prob. Ct. 2005), or In re Request for order 
requiring Facebook, inc. to produce documents and things, Case No: C 12-80171 LHK (PSG), 
9/20/201, for a commentary see J J Darrow and G Ferrera, “Who Owns a Decedent’s E-Mails: 
Inheritable Probate Assets or Property of the Network?” (2006) 10 NYU Journal of Legislation & 
Public Policy 281-320, at 287. 
21 See e.g. Case of Éditions Plon v. France, no. 58148/00, ECHR 2004-IV. 
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It is not an ambition of this paper to explore all the possible arguments for protecting 
post-mortem privacy. Rather, the focus will be, as already emphasised, on the 
informational privacy of the deceased. Notwithstanding the general arguments above, 
it is argued here that some form of protection to the deceased person’s data should be 
envisaged. The protection need not be perpetual or all encompassing, and relevant 
safeguard for the freedom of expression, for historical records and archives, and for 
legitimate interests of others should be provided. However, freedom of testation and 
wishes of the deceased should be respected. In the absence of the deceased’s wishes, 
the protection could be achieved through certain default rules in the data protection 
regimes. This would be a useful addition to protection already provided by copyright, 
personality rights, or rights to dignity. The paper will further focus on discussing legal 
options and models for protecting post-mortem privacy through the Data Protection 
Regulation. 
3. The current regimes and decedent’s data 
The protection of post-mortem privacy will now be assessed from the angle of 
informational privacy and the current state of affairs in this area within the EU.  
The Data Protection Directive does not mention deceased´s data in any context. 
However, keeping in mind the manoeuvring space in implementation that a directive 
affords to EU member states22, it has been possible for member states to introduce 
some kind of a post-mortem protection, even limited in its scope, and for a shorter 
period of time after death. There are only few examples of member states, which have 
taken advantage of this possibility.  
Bulgaria, for instance, recognises that “in event of death of the natural person his/her 
rights shall be exercised by his/her heirs”,23 thus extending the right of access to 
personal data not only to the natural person, but also to his or her family. The 
Estonian Data Protection Act goes even further, giving a considerable amount of 
freedom to an individual to decide on the use of personal data in the event of 
processing personal data with the consent of a data subject.24 In s 12 it states: “The 
consent of a data subject shall be valid during the life of the data subject and thirty 
years after the death of the data subject, unless the data subject has decided 
otherwise.” Furthermore, in s 13 it entitles certain family members to permit 
processing of personal data after the death of the data subject, but again for no more 
than thirty years after death.25 
                                                
22 See ECJ ruling in Lindquist case: „On the other hand, nothing prevents a Member State from 
extending the scope of the national legislation implementing the provisions of Directive 95/46 to areas 
not included within the scope thereof, provided that no other provision of Community law precludes 
it.“ Judgment of the European Court of Justice C-101/2001 of 06/11/2003, § 98. 
23 Article 28 (3) Bulgarian Personal Data Protection Act, State Gazette No. 1/4.01.2002, 
70/10.08.2004, 93/19.10.2004, 43/20.05.2005, 103/23.12.2005, 30/11.04.2006, available in English at: 
http://legislationline.org/topics/country/39/topic/3 (accessed 05 Jan 2013). 
24 Estonia, Personal Data Protection Act, RT1 I 2003, 26, 158, RT I 2004, 30, 208, available in English 
at: http://www.legaltext.ee/text/en/X70030.htm (accessed 05 Jan 2013) 
25 Ibid, Article 13(1). 
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Conversely, the Swedish Data Protection Act explicitly refers to personal data of the 
living, defining personal data as “all kinds of information that directly or indirectly 
may be referable to a natural person who is alive.”26 Similarly, the UK Data 
Protection Act defines personal data as “data which relate to a living individual”.27 
Other member states also predominantly use the term “natural person”; understood 
generally as a person having legal capacity, starting with the birth and ending with her 
death.28 
Article 29 Working Party, discussing the concept of personal data, maintains that: 
“Information relating to dead individuals is, therefore, in principle, not to be 
considered as personal data, subject to the rules of the Directive”.29 However, it also 
notes that, in certain cases, the deceased`s data could receive some kind of protection. 
Thus, the controller or processor may not be able to ascertain whether a person is 
alive or not; protection could be awarded indirectly, since the data could be connected 
to those of a living person; some legal rules other than data protection could protect 
the deceased`s personal data (doctor-patient confidentiality, for example). Finally, 
member states could extend the scope of the national legislation implementing the 
provisions of Directive 95/46/EC, and include protection of some aspects of 
deceased`s personal data.30 The last option, as demonstrated above, has been used by 
some member states. 
However, most of the EU member states did not utilise the possibility of extending 
the definitions of personal data and data subjects in their legislation. Furthermore, 
even the existing legislation is not consistent, and gives only limited protection for the 
deceased’s data, both in the scope and the length of protection awarded. The 
legislation is not harmonised and gives different powers to the heirs and data subjects. 
In sum, in spite of the general possibility of protecting post-mortem privacy through 
the EU data protection regime(s), this protection is only sporadic and lacks clarity and 
harmonisation. 
4. The revised EU data protection regime 
4.1. Definition of personal data and the deceased 
Let us now turn to the forthcoming reforms of the EU data protection regime and 
assess whether it could include protection of post-mortem privacy. The proposal will 
be looked at from the perspective of the data subject and personal data definitions in 
order to identify if the regulation generally includes the deceased’s personal data in 
the scope of the protection it envisages.  
                                                
26 S 3, Sweden, Personal Data Protection Act (1998:204), available in English at: 
http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/01/55/42/b451922d.pdf (accessed 05 Jan 2013) 
27 S 1 (1) (e) Data Protection Act 1998 c. 29. 
28 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data, 
01248/07/EN WP 136, at 22. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid, 16, 22, 23. 
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The European Commission Proposal for the General Data Protection Regulation does 
not mention deceased persons or their data at all. Having in mind a definition of 
personal data and the data subject, as set in Article 4 of the Proposal, it could be 
concluded that only living, natural persons’ data are within the scope of protection in 
the Proposal (“'data subject' means an identified natural person or a natural person 
who can be identified...”). Moreover, in the revised version proposed by the Council 
of the European Union, deceased persons are explicitly excluded as data subjects: 
“The principles of data protection should not apply to deceased persons.”31 This 
amendment has been advocated by the Council representative of Sweden, a country 
that excludes the deceased’s data explicitly, as noted above. If the proposal is adopted 
in that text, or in one similar, we would have a more disadvantageous situation for the 
protection of decedents’ personal data than the current one described earlier. Provided 
that the Regulation is adopted in that form and with the aforementioned or similar 
content, member states would not be entitled to change its text and, hypothetically, 
award protection to the deceased`s personal data.32 The most recent European 
Parliament Draft Report, however, does not contain this amendment and retains the 
definition initially proposed by the Commission, with some clarifications that do not 
consider the deceased’s data.33 There is, apparently, a long way to go before the text is 
finalised and all the options still seem open. Nevertheless, having seen different 
proposals so far, the option of explicitly including the deceased’s data within the 
scope of the protection awarded by the new regime appears quite unrealistic. 
Conversely, it could be argued that some elements of the proposal could be seen, at 
least hypothetically, as promoting post-mortem privacy protection. There are certain 
novelties in the proposals, which could serve as a base for discussing a potential shift 
in the EU data protection system and a move towards the property-based regime. The 
first proposal refers to a more general shift towards the commodification of personal 
data and, arguably, a certain departure from the human rights basis for the protection 
of personal data. The proposals for introducing the right to be forgotten and data 
portability could also serve to support this argument. Thus, the proposal will be 
further assessed through the lens of propertisation of personal data and its possible, 
hypothetical, effects on post-mortem privacy.  
                                                
31Revised Recital 23, Council of the European Union, Letter from the Presidency to Working Party on 
Data Protection and Exchange of Information, 2012/0011 (COD), Brussels, 22 Jun 2012, available at 
http://amberhawk.typepad.com/files/blog_june2012_eu-council-revised-dp-position.pdf (accessed 05 
Jan 2013). 
32 See e.g. Frontini v Ministero delle Finanze, C - 183 [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 372 (“...regulations...should 
not be the subject of state-issued provisions which reproduce them, either in full or in an executory 
manner, and which could differ from them or subject their entry into force to conditions, even less 
which take their place, derogate from them or abrogate them, even in part.” p 12). 
33 See amendments 14 and 84 in Jan-Philipp Albrecht, a Rapporteur for the European Parliament's Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee, Draft Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individual with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) 
2012/0011(COD) 17.12.2012. 
 
(2013) 10:1 SCRIPTed 
 
29 
4.2. The Proposal for propertisation of personal data? 
4.2.1. General features of property-based data protection 
Before assessing the Proposal in the light of the propertisation of personal data, it is 
useful to present the main feature of such a regime. As opposed to the data protection 
models based on human rights or torts, there is a widely discussed model of property 
rights in personal data. European countries have mainly perceived privacy and control 
over personal data as a human right,34 whereas the US has been using a torts model to 
protect privacy.35 The UK is somewhere in between. The property-based model is 
merely a theoretical construction, as it has not been applied so far. 
The property rights model is based on a presumption that personal data in practice 
already are, or should be considered, as an asset or commodity. For economists, this 
debate is less controversial and the value of personal data as a new asset has been 
recognised. Thus, for instance, the World Economic Forum (WEF) in its 2011 
personal data study, referring to personal data as “the new ‘oil’ – a valuable resource 
of the 21st century”, predicts that ˝it will emerge as a new asset class touching all 
aspects of society.˝36 The term “asset” in this debate is closely related to the notion of 
"commodification”, originally a Marxian concept37, but given different meanings by 
contemporary economic theory. Radin, for example, usefully defines this concept 
both in a narrow and broad sense. For her, in the narrow sense of the term, 
“commodification describes actual buying and selling (or legally permitted buying 
and selling) of something.” On the other hand, broadly, commodification includes also 
“market rhetoric, the practice of thinking about interactions as if they were sale 
transactions, and market methodology, the use of monetary cost-benefit analysis to 
judge these interactions.” In addition, the most extreme notion “universal 
commodification” solves problems of contested commodities (such as bodily parts, 
blood, or information and personal data) “by making everything in principle a 
commodity.”38 Under this conception, personal data, especially given its 
aforementioned market value, could certainly qualify as a commodity and an asset. 
                                                
34 Article 8 of The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007/C 303/01, or see J E J  
Prins, “Privacy and Property: European Perspectives and the Commodification of our Identity” in L 
Guibault and P B Hugenholtz (eds), The Future of the Public Domain (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2006) 223-257. 
35 Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A-652E (1977) or A J McClurg, “A Thousand Words are 
Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling” (2003) 98 Northwestern 
University Law Review 63-144. 
36 World Economic Forum “Personal Data: The Emergence of a New Asset Class” 2001 available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ITTC_PersonalDataNewAsset_Report_2011.pdf (accessed 10 
Jan 2013) at 5, 7. 
37 K Marx A contribution to the critique of political economy, translated from the German by S W 
Ryazanskaya, edited by M Dobb (Moscow: Progress; London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971) and vol. 1 
part 1 ch 1 in K Marx and F Engels (ed), Capital; a critique of political economy (New York: 
International Publishers 1967). 
38 M J Radin, “Market-inalienability” (1986) 100 Harvard Law Review 1849-1937, at 1861. 
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The legal recognition of personal data as an asset is less clear and far more 
controversial. 
The property rights model for the protection of privacy has been debated rather 
extensively within the US legal and economic scholarship. One of the first advocates 
of the property model, Westin,39 discussed it as early as 1968. Building on his theory, 
Laudon proposed “market-based mechanisms based upon individual ownership of 
personal information and National Information Markets (NIM) where individuals can 
receive fair compensation for information about themselves.”40 Other eminent US 
legal academics, proposing different variations and adjustments to this model, are: 
Schwartz,41 Mell,42 Zarsky,43 Lessig,44 etc. The arguments that proponents of this 
system use concentrate around one main goal: enabling individuals to better control 
the collection, use and transfer of their personal data, and to participate in sharing the 
profits resulting from the use, and processing of, their personal data. Lessig argues 
that this model can be supported by the Privacy Enhancing Technologies that enable 
users “both to encrypt and to express preferences about what personal data is 
collected by others.”45 He argues that privacy should be regulated within the regime 
of property law so that people could “take ownership of this right, and protect it” like 
it is the case with copyright.46 Along this line, when discussing the model and, in 
principle, arguing against it, Samuelson detects its two main benefits: an ability of 
individuals to sell their personal data and recoup some of their value in the market and 
to force companies to internalise these new costs and make better decisions on 
investing in the collection and use of personal data.47 In addition, since property rights 
are rights in rem and have erga omnes effect (can be enforced against anyone), 
property in personal data could help individuals to protect their rights, not only 
against data controllers, but against third parties as well, such as, for instance, 
mirroring websites, which store personal data without either the data subject or the 
data controller being aware of it.48 Also, using the same argument that Conley applied 
for the US context, Koops finds that an important benefit of the property over the torts 
                                                
39 A F Westin, Privacy and freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967). 
40 K C Laudon, “Markets and privacy” (1996) 39 (9) Communications of the ACM 92-104, at 96. 
41 P M Schwartz, “Property, privacy, and personal data” (2003) 117 Harvard Law Review 2056-2128. 
42 P Mell, “Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic 
Wilderness” (1996) 11 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1-79. 
43 T Z Zarsky, “Desperately seeking solutions: using implementation-based solutions for the troubles of 
information privacy in the age of data mining and the internet society” (2004) 56 Maine Law Review 
13-59. 
44 L Lessig, Code, version 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006). 
45 Ibid, 276. 
46 In Code 2.0 Lessig adds a new model, where P3P negotiates and concludes “contract” with the 
website. Ibid, 229 – 230. 
47 P Samuelson, “Privacy as intellectual property” (1999) 52 Stanford Law Review 1125-1167, at 1128. 
48 Similarly, B J Koops, “Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical Analysis of the 'Right to 
Be Forgotten' in Big Data Practice” (2011) 8(3) SCRIPTed 229-256. 
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privacy regime—namely, that there is no need for individuals to demonstrate harm— 
works well for the European context, too.49  
There are, nevertheless, notable disadvantages of this model. Litman, for example, 
forcefully argues that the property model would encourage transactions in personal 
data, which should, in fact, be discouraged. Also, alienability, as a feature of property, 
would vest control in the data miner, rather than the individual.50 Cohen likewise 
maintains that property rights in personal data would enable more trade in personal 
data, and would ultimately result in less privacy.51 Similarly, Samuelson notes that 
individuals would not be able to control the further transfer of their personal data, 
given that free alienability is a “a common, even if not ubiquitous” characteristic of 
property, which would allow the purchaser of personal data to sell it further and, 
therefore, lessen the control that that owner initially had.52 Furthermore, there are 
legitimate concerns for an imbalance with freedom of expression that propertisation 
of personal data may create. In this regard, Litman warns that recognising property in 
personal data would mean recognising property in facts, which are “building blocks of 
expression; of self-government; and of knowledge itself” and, thus, would entitle the 
owner to restrict different uses of the fact.53 Along this line of argument, Samuelson 
finds this regime inappropriate for the protection of personal data, arguing that it 
effectively creates a new regime of intellectual property in information with 
completely different purposes and mechanisms than that of the traditional intellectual 
property system.54 Furthermore, if privacy is considered a human right, propertisation 
of personal data could seem unnecessary and even, as Samuelson notes, “morally 
obnoxious”. She makes a comparison with other civil rights, concluding that, from 
this perspective, “it may make no more sense to propertize personal data than to 
commodify voting rights.”55  
European judiciary and academics mainly refuse to perceive personal data as a 
commodity, arguing that human rights maintain and reflect personal integrity and 
liberty, and, therefore, there is no room for a property approach. Consequently, 
privacy is inseparable from personhood, as a human right cannot be waived or 
transferred.56 However, the issue of transferability of human rights in general is not 
                                                
49 Ibid, 247. 
50 J Litman, “Information privacy/information property” (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1283-1313, at 
1304. 
51 J E Cohen, “Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object” (2000) 52 Stanford 
Law Review 1373-1426, at 1391. 
52P Samuelson, see note 47 above, at 1136. 
53 J Litman, see note 50 above, at 1296. 
54 P Samuelson, see note 47 above, at 1129. 
55 Ibid, 1140, 1141. 
56 see J E J Prins, see note 34 above, at 234-235 or N Purtova “Private Law Solutions in European Data 
Protection: Relationship to Privacy, and Waiver of Data Protection Rights” (2010) 28 (2) Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 179-198, or conversely see C Cuijpers, "A private law approach to privacy; 
mandatory law obliged?" (2007) 24(4) SCRIPT-ed 304-318. 
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very clear and the European Court of Human Rights has recognised the possibility for 
individuals to waive their human rights, though not in an explicit manner.57 Building 
on this underlying presumption on the possibility to waive a human right, Prins points 
at the nature of the Data Protection Directive provisions, which are in most cases not 
mandatory, and argues that the current EU regime allows contracting and commercial 
exploitation of personal data.58 Some commentators argue for the opposite. Citing 
Mellacher and Others v Austria , De Schutter, for instance, rejects a possibility of 
waiving or limiting the right to privacy in any way.59 This appears to be the correct 
position, as the European Court of Human Rights unambiguously declared a non-
transferable nature of the right to privacy, 60 as opposed to a more contested position 
on transferability of human rights in general. 
Nevertheless, Prins goes even a step further, characterising the EU regime as 
utilitarian, mainly due to the fact that it aims to promote the free flow of personal 
data. Using this information, as well as recognising the tools of control that are 
available to individuals pursuant to the Directive, Prins rather controversially argues 
that the EU regime is more receptive to a property regime than the regime of the US.61 
Similarly, discussing the property model, Purtova argues that it could provide a good 
framework, which would enable better control of personal data, even within the EU, 
notwithstanding the differences in property concepts both in common and civil law 
countries. She argues primarily for introducing the protective features of property, its 
erga omnes effect, rather than its alienability feature.62    
                                                
57 Deweer/Belgium, ECHR 27 Feb 1980, A 35 §48-54. 
58 J E J Prins, see note 34 above, at 243. 
59 “The right one has to freedom of expression or to respect for private life does not extend to the right 
to obtain, under the mechanisms of the market, a remuneration for the sacrifice of that right, or even for 
agreeing to that right being limited in some less complete way.“ O De Schutter "Waiver of Rights and 
State Paternalism under the European Convention on Human Rights" (2000) 51 The Northern Ireland 
legal quarterly 481-508, at 487; see Mellacher and Others v. Austria, Application No. 10522/83; 
11011/84; 11070/84, Judgement of 19/12/1989 para 506; also N Purtova, see note 56 above, at 16. 
60 See in this regard the EC Data Protection Regulation Proposal see note 9 above, at 2. “The Court 
confirmed the principle that Article 8 was of a non-transferrable nature and could thus not be pursued 
by a close relative or other successor of the immediate victim in the cases of Thevenon v. 
France ((dec.), no. 2476/02, 28 June 2006) and Mitev (cited above).” para 79 Koch v Germany, see 
note 17 above 
61 Ibid, 245. 
62 “Property, with some limitations resolved by regulation, due to its erga omnes effect and 
fragmentation of property rights, has the potential to reflect and control this complexity of 
relationships. This may be considered an instance of property exercising its protective rather than 
market function; it aims at making sure that even after transfer of a fraction of rights, a data subject 
always retains basic control over his personal information.” N Purtova “Property in Personal Data: 
Second Life of an Old Idea in the Age of Cloud Computing, Chain Informatisation, and Ambient 
Intelligence” in S Gutwirth et al (eds.), Computers, Privacy and Data Protection: an Element of Choice 
(Springer Science Business Media B.V. 2011) 39-64, at 61. 
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4.2.2. Is there a move towards propertisation of personal data in the EU? 
Even if we did not initially agree with arguments put forward by Prins or Purtova 
about receptiveness of the EU data protection regime towards the property rationale, 
the proposed framework could provide us with more arguments and indications 
supporting this viewpoint. The first, interesting and perhaps indicative example is the 
narrative that points to a move towards the property model of protecting personal 
data. This move has not been explicitly endorsed, but it can be traced in some 
European Commission officials’ statements.63 These statements may be seen as 
unintentional, when referring to the property model, but the content of the Data 
Protection Regulation Proposal certainly indicates this tendency. Apart from this 
anecdotal argument, the parallel between the property-based data protection regime 
and the new proposal for a European Regulation can be drawn in relation to the 
proposal’s aim to provide  better control of individuals in relation to the collection and 
use of their personal data.64 The aim is compatible with the main goal of property-
based regimes, discussed above. Additionally, the proposal strongly aims to promote 
the free flow of personal data. This is clearly a utilitarian goal, and one of the main 
reasons for establishing private property regimes in general.65 Some authors would go 
even further and argue that the proposed regime neglects the human rights basis of the 
data protection regime.66 
In addition to these general features of the new regime that resemble a property 
model, further arguments could be traced in two notable innovations of the proposal: 
the “right to be forgotten” and data portability. The “right to be forgotten” is 
introduced in the Article 17 of the General Data Protection Regulation Proposal. So 
far, data subjects have had a right to request deletion of personal data the processing 
of which does not comply with the provisions of the Directive,67 but this right is not 
as comprehensive as the right to be forgotten. The new right would encompass not 
only the right to have personal data erased, but also “the abstention from further 
dissemination of such data.”68 The right includes a duty of data controllers, who have 
                                                
63“Our proposal starts from everybody owning their own personal data.” N Kroes, Vice-President of the 
European Commission responsible for the Digital Agenda, EU Data protection reform and Cloud 
Computing, SPEECH/12/40, 30/01/2012, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/40&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed 10 Jan 2013). 
64 See recital 6 and p 2 of the Data Protection Regulation Proposal, see note 9 above. 
65 As stated in recitals 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 14, 78, 96, 105, 133 and Article 46 of the Data Protection 
Regulation Proposal; for a theoretical perspective see e.g. L C Becker Property rights: philosophic 
foundations (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977) at 68-70; V Pareto Manual of political economy (Kelley 
1971); G S Alexander and E M Peñalver An Introduction to property theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2012) at 14. 
66 See e.g. Amberhawk Training Limited, Hawktalk, “EU Data Protection Regulation Breaks Explicit 
Link With “Privacy” and Human Rights” 02 Feb 2012 available at 
http://amberhawk.typepad.com/amberhawk/2012/02/eu-data-protection-regulation-breaks-explicit-link-
with-privacy-and-human-rights.html (accessed 10 January 2013). 
67 Article 12(b) of the Data Protection Directive, see note 8 above. 
68 Article 17 (1) General Data Protection Regulation Proposal, see note 9 above. 
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made the personal data public, to inform third parties of the data subject's request to 
erase any links to, or copy or replicate that personal data.69 The Draft Report has 
recently significantly reduced the proposed effects of the right to be forgotten, 
changing its title into “right to erasure and to be forgotten”,70 and noting that the 
Commission’s proposal is not quite realistic. It remains to be seen what the final text 
will look like, as does the previously mentioned concept of the data subject. 
The European Commission’s proposal to include this “right to be forgotten” in the 
new data protection regime has caused a lot of controversy between privacy 
opponents and companies.71 The right to be forgotten, however, will not be explored 
here in any detail. For the purpose of this paper, it serves as an example of another 
similarity between the proposal and propertisation of personal data. It could be 
argued that this right resembles the right to destroy, an essential feature of property.72 
In this regard, Koops is one of the rare scholars, who compared the right to be 
forgotten to abusus, a feature of property (“strongest property stick” - the right to 
destroy). However, he approaches this comparison with caution, maintaining that, if 
the right to be forgotten is cast in the form of abusus, all other property rights (usus 
and fructus) would have to be allocated to individuals. For him, this would be “a 
bridge or two too far.”73 This is not necessarily correct, given  the difference between 
property concepts and “sticks” that are contained within “bundle of property rights” in 
the civilian and common law jurisdictions. The common law concept of property 
appears to be more open-ended and relative, as opposed to the more absolutely 
defined concept in the civilian countries. Therefore, the common law property could 
include different rights and objects, and does not need to be equated to the concept of 
ownership (which would necessarily include all the “sticks”).74 Consequently, not all 
the “sticks” would have to be allocated to individuals in the property-based data 
protection regime.   
                                                
69 Ibid, Article 17 (2). 
70 Draft Report, see note 33 above, amendments 146 and 153. 
71 See e.g. Koops see note 48 above, at 537-539 (discussing issues such as: conflicts of the right to be 
forgotten and provisions of the Data Retention Directive; issues involving social networks, such as 
destruction of responsibility between them and users, applying household exemption and the right to be 
forgotten simultaneously; problems with mirroring etc.); M Masnick, Techdir “Europeans Continue To 
Push For 'Right To Be Forgotten'; Claim Americans 'Fetishize' Free Speech” 04 Feb 2011 available at 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110204/00145312961/europeans-continue-to-push-right-to-be-
forgotten-claim-americans-fetishize-free-speech.shtml (accessed 10 Jan 2013); ENISA (the European 
Network and Information Security Agency) “Study on Data Collection and Storage in the EU”, 20 Feb 
2012, at 52; ENISA “The Right to be Forgotten - Between Expectations and Practice”, 20 November 
2012, at 2; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 01/2012 on the Data Protection Reform 
Proposals, 00530/12/EN  WP 191, at 13, 14; P Fleischer “The Right to Be Forgotten, or How to Edit 
Your History”, 29 Jan 2012 http://peterfleischer.blogspot.co.uk/2012/01/right-to-be-forgotten-or-how-
to-edit.html (accessed 10 January 2013). 
72 See e.g. L Becker "The Moral Basis of Property Rights" in J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman (eds), 
Property (New York: New York University Press, 1980) 187-220, at 190-191. 
73 B J Koops, see note 48 above, at 247. 
74 See e.g. W G Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society, 2nd ed. (Harmondsworth, Eng: Penguin, 
1972), at 94; or J Ball “The Boundaries of Property Rights in English Law” (2006) 10(3) Electronic 
Journal of Comparative Law, 1-34, at 4. 
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Another novelty in the proposal is the data subject´s right to data portability. Article 
18 introduces this right, i.e., to obtain from the controller personal data “undergoing 
processing” (when data have been collected and processed based on consent or a 
contract) and transfer those data from one electronic processing system to and into 
another (e.g. to a social network), without being prevented from doing so by the 
controller. As a precondition for that, the controller is obliged to provide those data in 
a structured and commonly used electronic format. The right to data portability is also 
subject to extensive debates and revisions to the initially proposed text. The European 
Parliament Draft Report proposes deletion of the whole article 18 and its merging 
with article 15 (Right of access for the data subject), noting that the right to data 
portability is “a mere specification of the right to data access and thus diminishing to 
an extent its initial force.”75 As noted for the other proposals discussed above, it will 
be interesting to see the final form and content of this right. It does not however, 
substantially affect the discussion in this paper. This is due to the fact that in any 
version provided so far, the right significantly departs from the current regime, which 
does not contain anything resembling such a right, and adds a significant new value to 
the data protection regime.76 The right to data portability could empower individuals 
and provide for a better control over their personal data, as they would be able to 
leave the provider/platform that does not satisfy their privacy requirements, for 
instance, or just shift to a provider with better services.77 Rather than discussing this 
right in detail, for the purpose of this paper, it is important to note that the features of 
this right are noticeably reminiscent of transfer of property. However, it is not a 
lucrative right and its enforcement is not possible post-mortem, for example, to 
stipulate in a will the transfer of personal data from Facebook to Google+, or to a 
memorial website. It is not, however, certain whether it would be practically viable to 
transfer data post-mortem, even if permitted. The value of personal data of the 
deceased for businesses is questionable and needs further research. Data portability in 
this context was used merely to further highlight the resemblance of the proposed data 
protection regime to the property regime, even if not consistently and entirely. 
4.2.3. Propertisation of personal data and transmission upon death 
In theory, a property regime for the protection of personal data would arguably entail 
individual`s control and entitlement to transfer their personal data, not only in life, but 
also upon death, whether by testamentary or intestacy means. The reason for that is 
that transfer, both in life and upon death, has traditionally been considered one of the 
main features of property.78 Consequently, in theory, it would enable a better 
                                                
75 The EP Draft Report, see note 33 above, amendment 141. 
76 See Article 12 of the Data Protection Directive. 
77 Zanfir for instance argues that “data portability is a pillar of a stronger, more effective right to 
control over the processing of the data subject’s personal data, along with the right to be forgotten and 
the right to modify incorrect or outdated personal information stored in databases.“ G Zanfir “The right 
to Data portability in the context of the EU data protection reform” (2012) 2 (3) International Data 
Privacy Law, 149-162, at 161-162. 
78 E.g. A M Honoré “Ownership” in A. G. Guest (ed), Oxford essays in jurisprudence, a collaborative 
work (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), L Becker in J R Pennock and J W Chapman, see note 
72 above, at 107-147; “The essential feature of property is that it has an existence independent of a 
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protection of post-mortem privacy, as the deceased would be able to decide on the 
faith of his data.  
Essentially, all the property, personal and real, corporeal and incorporeal, (to name 
but a few kinds), form an inheritance, or the estate of a person, and transmits by the 
rules of succession to the deceased’s heirs. In England, for instance, “a person’s estate 
is the aggregate of all the property to which he is beneficially entitled”.79 In French 
law, with the notion of patrimoine,80 comprising a person’s rights and liabilities, all 
rights and liabilities pass on the heir(s), in a way that they stand in the position of the 
deceased.81 The same is valid in Germany.82 
Conversely, the liability or torts regimes83 would not entirely persist upon a person’s 
demise. For instance, in some cases in common law jurisdictions, purely personal 
obligations “die with a person”.84 This position, however, has been revised in England 
and most of the personal actions arising from torts would survive, according to the 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934.  Only defamation and the 
bereavement claim would not persist. As noted above, in French and German law, 
liabilities do pass on to the heirs, in a way that they stand in the position of the 
deceased.85 Similar to English common law, French law states that strictly personal 
contracts (either by the agreement of the parties86 or the nature of the contract87) 
terminate upon death.88 This would be the case with most terms of service online, 
                                                                                                                                       
particular person: it can be bought and sold, given and received, bequeathed and inherited, pledged or 
seized to secure debts, acquired (in the olden days) by a husband on marrying its owner.” OBG v Allan 
[2007] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 A.C. 1 at 309. 
79 Sec 3 Wills Act 1837 c. 26, this Act does not extend its effect to Scotland; sec 5 (1) Inheritance Tax 
Act 1984 c. 51, applicable to England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Island; similarly Succession 
(Scotland) Act 1964 c. 41  in sec 32 defines estate as property belonging to the deceased at the time of 
death. 
80 The place where property and obligations meet, similar to the concept of estate in English law. B 
Nicholas, The French law of contract (2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University 
Press 1992), at 29, 30. 
81 For more see M L Levillard “France” in D J Hayton, ed, European succession laws (2nd ed. Bristol: 
Jordans 2002) 211-243, at 219. 
82 K Kuhne et al. “Germany” in Hayton ibid, 243-271, at 257. 
83 Torts - the term used in English common law; liability, delict in civil law: a civil wrong, causing a 
damage or harm to another person, either by fault, intention, negligence or imprudence; arts 1382, 1383 
Code Civil, sec 823 BGB, or R F V Heuston and R A Buckley., Salmond and Heuston on the law of 
torts, 21st ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), at 8; for a  comparative analysis see C Van Dam 
European tort law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
84 Principle “Actio personalis moritur cum persona” in Beker v Bolton, see note 10 above; for the 
comparison between the US and German perspective, see e.g. H Rosler “Dignitarian Posthumous 
Personality Rights—An Analysis of US and German Constitutional and Tort Law” (2008) 26 Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 153-205. 
85 For more see M L Levillard in D. J. Hayton see note 81 above, at 219. 
86 Code civil art 1122. 
87 Ibid art 1795. 2003. 
88 Or for more see Nicholas, see note 80 above, at 172. 
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which explicitly exclude transfer or transmission upon the death of the user’s 
accounts, of the user’s data, and of the users’ content.89 Therefore, torts or contracts 
regimes do not seem to be favourable to post-mortem privacy protection, assessed in 
relation to the law of succession. Another argument to support this claim is the 
European Court of Human rights case law that clearly establishes a non-transferable 
nature of the human right to privacy.90 
To conclude, if we accept, from the reasons discussed in the section 4.2.2 of this 
paper, that the proposed regime silently promotes the idea of property in personal 
data, this could indicate its suitability for protecting post-mortem privacy, as opposed 
to torts or contracts regimes. Propertisation of personal data would need to produce 
transmission upon death, by giving an option to individuals to decide what happens to 
their personal data upon death, in the case of testamentary succession, or by default 
rules that enable their heirs to decide what happens to their data. However, if adopted 
as proposed, this provision for the “right to be forgotten”, for instance, would enable 
individuals to control their post-mortem privacy, only if they decide to “be forgotten 
online” and exercise this right before death. Since the regulation proposal, as currently 
drafted, would not award protection of personal data to the decedents of the deceased 
person, it would not allow them to stipulate their wish to be forgotten in a will, or to 
leave that decision to their heirs. This, on the other hand, would be a logical 
consequence, if the property rights model been adopted in full.  
This paper, however, does not argue that propertisation is a good solution for the EU 
data protection. Propertisation has been discussed only insofar as it would enable 
some form of protection of post-mortem privacy. It is used as an example of how, in 
theory, this protection could be achieved. Thus, it is not argued herein that 
propertisation is the best approach, as adoption of this solution would open various 
other issues that probably could not be solved satisfactory in the EU context. Some of 
these issues have been discussed in the section 4.2.1. As noted therein, propertisation 
could result in less control as it would enable more trade in personal data and vest 
control in the data controllers, not the data subjects. Also, it would jeopardise freedom 
of expression and threaten balances that intellectual property attempts to establish, 
when refusing to propertise facts. Finally, it would be contrary to the long established 
human rights rhetoric and legal practice in the EU, which does not favour the 
commodification narrative. The human rights approach is deemed to be more 
appealing, as it aims to balance the right to privacy and other human rights, such as 
freedom of expression, and vest control over personal data primarily in individuals. 
According to this practice, the new regime would need to comply with the Article 16 
of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the Lisbon Treaty), which 
establishes the principle that everyone has the right to the protection of personal data, 
and with Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.  
                                                
89 E.g. L Edwards and E Harbinja “What Happens to My Facebook Profile When I Die?': Legal Issues 
Around Transmission of Digital Assets on Death” in B Ford (ed), Digital Legacy and Interaction: 
Post-Mortem Issues, (Springer 2013, forthcoming) Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2222163 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2222163 (accessed 10 Mar 2013) 
90 Koch v Germany, see note 17 above 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper attempts to initiate the discussion about post-mortem privacy and personal 
data of the deceased amongst legal scholars. It also notes possible points of 
controversy within this phenomenon. The paper discussed current and newly 
proposed data protection regimes in the EU through the lens of post-mortem privacy. 
It asserted that the existing regime, based on the human rights model, hypothetically 
enabled the introduction and protection of post-mortem privacy, depending on the 
individual member state and regulatory choice made. However, this regime also 
contributed to the fragmentation of the protection, which is not beneficial for users, 
bearing in mind the global reach and nature of the Internet and social interaction 
therein. The new regime, as currently drafted, does not seem provide sufficient scope 
for protection of the deceased’s data. On the contrary, some versions of the proposal 
explicitly exclude the deceased. 
However, certain elements of the proposal could be viewed as favourable for post-
mortem privacy. The discussion about these elements was purely theoretical and it 
identified certain similarities of the new regime to the property-based data protection 
model. This has been illustrated by using examples of the “right to be forgotten” and 
data portability discussions, and referring to the aims of the proposal and the general 
discourse of commodification of personal data. Bearing in mind features of property, 
as opposed to the torts and contracts regime (post-mortem transferability, applied with 
aforementioned jurisdictional caution), the Data Protection Regulation Proposal could 
perhaps be seen as promoting the protection of deceased’s data.  
The paper does not suggest that the propertisation would be the best choice, 
especially since the long-established EU tradition of treating protection of personal 
data exists within the framework of the human right to privacy. It asserts that the 
human rights approach is better in that it requires adequate balances with the freedom 
of expression and vests control over personal data in individuals. In addition, within 
the EU, the commodification of personal data is a rhetoric that is generally perceived 
as unfavourable. 
It seems that a viable solution could be including the deceased’s data in the scope of 
the definition of personal data in the proposal, and awarding a time-limited protection, 
with appropriate safeguards in relation to the other relevant interests (freedom of 
expression, archives and historical records, etc.). In this way, the regime would  
continue to operate from a human rights basis, and a limited protection of the 
deceased’s data could be actualised. The paper, nevertheless, does not aim to propose 
clearly formulated solutions. This is merely a suggestion based on the above 
discussion. The main goal is to question the options and possibilities for post-mortem 
privacy, on the basis of the presumption made in section 2, that some kind of 
protection is, in fact, desirable. Further discussion and more concrete solutions will be 
offered in the author’s forthcoming thesis. 
 
